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Until 1993, the United States led the rest of the developed world in strengthening 
residence-based world-wide corporate and individual income taxation. Already in 1937, 
the US adopted its first regime aimed at “incorporated pocketbooks,” or foreign 
corporations controlled by five or fewer US individual taxpayers and designed to achieve 
deferral of US tax on foreign source passive income.2 This was followed in 1962 by the 
enactment of Subpart F, which sharply curtailed deferral for controlled subsidiaries of US 
multinationals (CFCs).3 Between 1962 and 1993, the US expanded the scope of Subpart 
F to include both passive income and other types of income that were likely subject to 
low or no source-based taxation (e.g., shipping and insurance income). 
 
The rest of the world followed. Germany was first in 1972, followed by Canada (1975), 
Japan (1978), France (1980), and the UK (1984). By 2008, 26 countries had CFC rules, 
including developing countries like Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, Argentina and 
Brazil. Moreover, many countries that traditionally had only territorial taxation (e.g., 
Israel and most of Latin America) moved to world-wide taxation of their residents. As a 
result, the traditional dividing line between global and territorial jurisdictions became 
blurred, so that it could be said that most countries tax foreign passive income of their 
residents, but they do not tax currently foreign source active income (which was entitled 
to deferral or exemption).4 
 
                                                 
2 The Foreign Personal Holding Company regime (IRC sections 551-558, repealed in 2004). 
3 IRC sec. 951-960. 
4 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007). 
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However, since 1994 this trend seems to have been reversed, at least in part. In the US, 
the ascension of the Republicans in Congress from 1994 to 2006 meant a steady stream 
of enactments cutting back on the scope of Subpart F. The first step was repealing IRC 
sec. 956A, which was enacted in 1993 and attempted to add an asset test to the income 
test of Subpart F, to prevent MNEs from reinvesting their active earnings in passive 
assets overseas instead of repatriating them as dividends to the US.5 Second, the PFIC 
rules, which were enacted in 1986 to address passive income of residents from foreign 
corporations whether or not they were CFCs, were made inapplicable to CFCs.6 Third, 
Congress enacted over President Clinton’s veto the banking and insurance exceptions to 
Subpart F, which meant that most income of banks and insurance companies was 
exempted because it is active, even though it can easily be earned in low-tax 
jurisdictions.7 Finally and most recently, all payments from one CFC to another were 
exempted, even when they are deductible and result in shifting income from a high to a 
low tax jurisdiction.8 
 
Similar developments were taking place overseas. In Europe, the driving force was the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), which held in Cadbury Schweppes that the U.K. may 
only tax profits of European subsidiaries under its CFC rules if there are wholly artificial 
arrangements intended to escape national tax normally payable.9 In addition, the French 
Administrative Supreme Court held in 2002 that France’s CFC rules were incompatible 
                                                 
5 IRC sec. 956A( repealed in 1994). 
6 IRC 1297(d) (1997). 
7 IRC 954(h), (i) (1997). 
8 IRC 954©(6) (2006). 
9 Cadbury Schweppes, ECJ Doc 2004-14844, 2004 WTD 141-7 (C-196/04). 
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with the France-Switzerland tax treaty.10 As a result, France in 2005 revised its CFC rules 
to overcome the decision, resulting in a higher threshold for their application.11  
 
The UK reacted to Cadbury Schweppes in 2007 by unveiling a consultation document 
that revealed that it was considering a significant narrowing of its CFC rules, as well as 
for the first time exempting actual dividends paid from active income of UK CFCs.12 
This reform has recently been put on hold because of its cost, but it is likely to be enacted 
eventually.13  
 
In the US, the most recent development has been the unveiling of a similar plan to 
exempt dividends paid out of non-Subpart F income (i.e., active income). The President’s 
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform proposed in 2005 that the United States should 
permanently switch from taxing the parent corporation of US multinationals on world-
wide income, to a modified territorial regime under which dividends paid out of active 
business income would be exempt from US tax.14 The Joint Committee on Taxation made 
a similar recommendation.15 These recommendations follow the enactment in 2004 of a 
one year reduced (5.25%) tax rate for such dividends, which resulted in the repatriation of 
over $300 billion in active earnings from CFCs of US MNEs.  
 
                                                 
10 French Supreme Court June 28 2002, no. 232276, Societe Schneider Electric: RJF 10/02, no. 1080; 
Marcelin Mbwa-Mboma, Treaty with Switzerland Overrides French CFC Legislation, French High Tax 
Court Confirms, 2002 WTD 127-1. 
11 Guillaume Goulard and Guillaume Jolly, French Lawmakers Revisit CFC Rules, 2005 WTD 13-4. 
12 "Taxation of the foreign profits of companies." (See Doc 2007-15183, 2007 WTD 124-8.) 
13 UK Government to Rethink Foreign Profit Plans, International Tax Review, July 22, 2008. 
14 President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform Report (2005), 102-105. 
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Thus, there seems to be a trend to reduce the scope of residence jurisdiction, while 
increasing the emphasis on source jurisdiction.16 If this trend continues, it seems likely 
that both traditional territorial countries like France and traditional world-wide countries 
like to UK and the US would move toward territoriality and decrease emphasis on their 
CFC rules. 
 
What is driving this trend? In Europe, the obvious answer is the ECJ. But this cannot be 
the whole story, because Cadbury Schweppes did not require member states to eliminate 
CFC rules, and it certainly does not force them to exempt foreign source active dividends. 
Moreover, the trend seems to extend beyond Europe. 
 
The argument that CFC rules are incompatible with Arts. 7 and 10 of the OECD Model 
has broader application, but in my opinion (and the OECD’s opinion) it is clearly wrong. 
The argument is that a CFC rule taxes a foreign corporation on its foreign source earnings 
without its having a PE in the residence jurisdiction, which arguably violates Art. 7 
(requiring no tax on business profits absent a PE), and taxes it on undistributed dividends, 
which arguably violates Art. 10 (requiring that dividends be paid). But Art. 7 was clearly 
written as a limitation on source jurisdiction, not on residence jurisdiction. In my opinion, 
what CFC rules do is redefine the residence of the CFC (i.e., make it a resident of the 
country of residence of its parent), and that is permissible under Art. 4.17 Once it is a 
resident, there is no treaty limit on residence-based taxation of all of the CFC’s income. 
                                                 
16 See Lee Sheppard, Revenge of the Source Countries, 2006 TNT 200-3 (October 17, 2006). 
17 The OECD agrees with this view, as shown by the Commentary on Art 7. See also Mitsuhiro Honda and 
Hugh J. Ault, Japanese CFC Rules Consistent with Treaty, Court Holds, 2008 WTD 50-9 (March 13, 
2008). 
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In my opinion, therefore, the reason for the trend to restrict CFC rules is political and 
economic, not legal: It is part of tax competition, specifically the competition to be the 
headquarters jurisdiction for MNEs. 
 
When Daimler bought Chrysler in 1998 to form Daimler/Chrysler AG, Juergen 
Schrempf, the CEO of Daimler/Chrysler, testified before the US Senate Finance 
Committee that Subpart F was a major reason that the combined company was German 
and not American. I do not think he was correct: The German government and the 
German unions would not have tolerated a takeover of Daimler by Chrysler, and German 
shareholders were subject to tax on capital gains (if Daimler/Chrysler were a US 
company) while US shareholders were not (if it were German). In addition, the German 
CFC rules are as tough as Subpart F. However, Schrempf addressed a broader 
phenomenon, which is that lawmakers are reasonably concerned about the impact of CFC 
rules on the decision where to incorporate MNEs. This can be shown for the US by the 
trend of inversion transactions, in which US MNEs reincorporated in Bermuda in part to 
avoid Subpart F.18 The trend was stopped by legislation in 2004, but the competitiveness 
issue continues. 
 
When deciding where to establish the headquarters of a new MNE, or of a newly merged 
combination of two MNEs, it makes sense to take tax into consideration. Why establish 
the parent in a jurisdiction with tough CFC rules and a tax on dividend repatriations, 
                                                 
18 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions, 95 Tax Notes 1793 
(June 17, 2002). 
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when it can just as easily be established in a jurisdiction with no or lax CFC rules and an 
exemption for dividends? 
 
In a world in which MNEs are mobile and can shift their headquarters (see, e.g., the 
recent migration of Halliburton and others to Dubai), and where headquarters bring 
positive externalities, it makes sense for lawmakers to respond by relaxing CFC rules and 
enacting exemption regimes.  
 
In addition, the dividend exemption proposal makes economic sense. The basic rationale 
for exempting dividends is based on Joel Slemrod’s observation that the efficiency of a 
tax should be measured by the ratio between the revenue it collects and the behavioral 
change it induces in taxpayers.19 In the case of the tax on dividends, it can be 
demonstrated that the revenue collected is small, because Jim Hines has shown that US 
multinationals repatriate only a small fraction of their overseas earnings.20 On the other 
hand, the behavioral impact is large, as can be seen from both Hines’ data (presumably, a 
major reason why US multinationals do not repatriate earnings is the tax on dividends) 
and even more vividly by the behavioral response to the one-year dividend repatriation 
tax partial amnesty enacted in 2004, which (as noted above) resulted in over $300 billion 
in income being repatriated. 
 
                                                 
19 Joel Slemrod, “A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation,” International Tax and 
Public Finance, March 2001, 8(2), pp. 119-128. 
20 James R. Hines Jr., "Dividend Policy Inside the Multinational Firm." M.A. Desai and C.F. Foley, co-
authors. Fin. Mgmt. 36, no. 1 (2007): 5-26. 
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But this trend has its attendant problems as well. The main argument against the US 
dividend exemption proposal is that like any move in the direction of territoriality, it puts 
more pressure on the source rules and on transfer pricing. Currently, US multinationals 
are constrained in their willingness to shift income from the US to foreign jurisdictions 
by the knowledge that to get it back into the US a price will have to be paid, in the form 
of the dividend tax. The same data cited above show that this constraint is real, and that 
the phenomenon of “trapped income” is significant. If we now abolish the tax on 
repatriation, it should be expected that US multinationals will have every incentive to 
shift even more income overseas. 
 
This issue would not be so problematic if our transfer pricing regime worked adequately 
to prevent income shifting. But as Kim Clausing and myself have shown, the current 
system is woefully inadequate to prevent income shifting.21 This can be shown, for 
example, by considering Table 2 in George Yin’s article, which shows high 
concentrations of E&P in the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg.22 Or 
consider the following data, which shows the top ten locations of profits of US 
multinationals in 2003:23 
                                                 
21 Reuven Avi-Yonah and Kimberly Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A 
Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, The Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution (2007); also in 
2007 TNT 114-38 (June 13, 2007). 
 
22 George K. Yin, Reforming the Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment by US Taxpayers, 2008 TNT 5-22 
(Jan. 8, 2008). 
23 Avi-Yonah and Clausing, Fig. 2. 
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Figure 1:  Where Were the Profits in 2003?  




































































U.K. Islands 1.3% 
Japan 36.9% 
 
In a world in which a third of the foreign profits of US-based multinationals are in 
countries with an effective tax rate of less than 10%, it seems dangerous to increase the 
incentive to shift profits by removing the one real disincentive to doing so- the 
knowledge that repatriation would bear tax. 
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Yin recognizes that this is a real problem, and states that “one modification Congress 
should consider is to require exempt income to be subject to tax somewhere.”24 The 
question is how to achieve this goal, which I fully support as being consistent with what I 
call the “single tax principle.”25 Yin proposes that a good proxy would be to apply 
dividend exemption only to countries with which we have a tax treaty. However, this 
would include a lot of jurisdictions with very low effective tax rates (see Yin’s Table 2, 
which includes in the list Austria, Barbados, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland). Of the top ten destinations in Figure 1, only two (Bermuda 
and the UK Islands) would not qualify for exemption under this modification. 
 
Therefore, I believe that if we are to adopt the exemption proposal, we must condition it 
on the actual effective tax rate in the source jurisdiction being high enough (e.g., 90% of 
the US rate). This is consistent with what our trading partners do, as well as with the 
original intent of Subpart F.26 I do not believe that it poses insuperable administrability 
obstacles, since US multinationals already have to report both the current earnings and 
profits and the actual tax paid by each CFC (see Yin’s table 2). It is similar to the 
“franking” mechanism employed by countries with dividend imputation systems to show 
that exempt dividends are paid out of income that was in fact subject to corporate level 
tax. 
 
                                                 
24 Yin, supra. 
25 Reuven Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax Regime, 61 IBFD 
Bulletin for International Taxation 130 (2007) 
. 
26 Reuven Avi-Yonah, U.S. Notice 98-11 and the Logic of Subpart F: A Comparative Perspective, Tax 
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However, another question is whether the US and other jurisdictions need to go down this 
road at all. The answer, I believe, is no: The solution to the competitiveness issue is 
collaboration, not more competition. 
 
This year marks the tenth anniversary of the OECD report on curbing harmful tax 
competition, in which the OECD member states bind themselves to "ensure that [CFC 
rules] apply in a fashion consistent with the desirability of curbing harmful tax 
practices."27  "Harmful tax practices" are defined to include tax holidays targeted at 
foreign investors.28  
 
If this recommendation is taken seriously, it means that it should be possible to combat 
deferral in a coordinated fashion, thus overcoming the competitiveness issue. The United 
States was the traditional leader in restricting deferral, and as noted above, other 
countries have followed. If the United States were to move now to restrict or even repeal 
deferral, the OECD report makes it very likely that other OECD members would also 
tighten their antideferral rules, just as they did in the 1970s in response to subpart F. 
Since 85 percent of all multinationals are based in OECD member countries, such a 
coordinated move by the OECD would effectively solve the competitiveness issue 
(because all the competitors of a U.S.-based MNE would be subject to the same 
antideferral rules as the U.S.-based MNE). 
 
On the other hand, if the United States were to adopt an exemption regime now, as the 
                                                 
27 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998), 40-41. 
28 Ibid., 27. 
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Advisory Panel recommended, this would in all likelihood lead other OECD members to 
expand deferral as well, despite the OECD report. We are thus in a classic prisoners' 
dilemma situation, but one that can be successfully resolved because of the availability of 
the OECD as a coordinating institution through which countries can credibly commit to 
limit their deferral or exemption regimes. 
 
Advocates of deferral may doubt that the OECD would actually be able to achieve the 
coordinated action needed to curtail deferral and support the single tax principle. 
However, there is a well-known example in which the OECD was successfully used to 
overcome such a prisoners' dilemma. In 1977, the United States unilaterally enacted a 
draconian set of rules applicable to U.S.-based MNEs, which drastically limited their 
ability to obtain projects abroad by bribing local officials. The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act made such behavior subject to criminal prosecution, as well as to tax penalties. This 
led predictably to an outcry by U.S.-based MNEs that their competitive position would 
become untenable because of their inability to follow local corrupt practices, while their 
foreign-based competitors faced no such impediments (in fact, Germany allowed a tax 
deduction for documented bribes). 
 
The result was a prolonged drive by the United States to get other OECD members to 
commit to enact similar tough laws. This drive finally culminated in the 1990s in the 
OECD anticorruption treaty, which anecdotal evidence suggests has already had a major 
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Of course, there is an important difference between bribes and taxes: Both are costs from 
the MNE's perspective, but from the government's perspective (and this applies even to 
governments in countries plagued by corruption) bribes are to be prohibited while taxes 
are to be collected. Thus, the MNEs themselves supported the OECD anticorruption 
effort, which enabled them to avoid paying bribes for fear of competition, while they are 
less supportive of the anti- tax-competition initiative, which would curtail their ability to 
avoid taxation. However, the basic prisoners' dilemma is the same, and therefore there is 
no reason why the OECD should not enable countries to advance the global goal of 
eliminating double non-taxation by limiting or even eliminating deferral, without 
impairing the competitiveness of "their" MNEs. The right answer to the competitiveness 
issue is, therefore, for the new U.S. Administration to push its allies in the OECD Forum 
on Harmful Tax Practices to act in a coordinated fashion to tighten their antideferral 
rules. The anticorruption example shows that such a push has a good chance of 
succeeding under current conditions. 
 
Even if all the OECD members adopted strict antideferral rules, this would still leave the 
door open to reincorporation in non-OECD member countries, and to formation of new 
companies in such countries. At the present time, few corporations are willing to 
reincorporate outside the OECD because of the likely loss of some shareholder 
protections and other reputational concerns. However, if reincorporation or formation of 
new MNEs in non-OECD countries becomes a significant trend, this may require further 
action by the OECD to protect the corporate tax base.29   
                                                 
29 See IRC 7874, enacted in 2004 to stop US-based MNEs from moving to Bermuda. 
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